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ROOT AND BRANCH: THE THIRTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE  
Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg* 
“[The Thirteenth Amendment] abolishes slavery . . . root and branch. It abol-
ishes it in the general and the particular. . . . Any other interpretation belittles 
the great amendment and allows slavery still to linger among us in some of its 
insufferable pretensions.”1 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, the state of North Carolina found itself in need of a new hazardous 
waste landfill.2 The landfill was needed to dispose of tons of soil that were con-
taminated—intentionally—by the Ward Transformer Company, which had 
sought to avoid the strictures of federal hazardous waste regulation by paying 
someone to simply spray PCB-contaminated oil along North Carolina roadsides 
in the middle of the night.3 The company was caught and company officials 
prosecuted.4 But the soil contaminated by these midnight activities had to go 
somewhere. That “somewhere” was Warren County—poor, rural, and mostly 
African American and Native American.5 
Borrowing from the civil rights movement playbook, Warren County resi-
dents organized and resisted.6 For two weeks, residents blocked access to the 
site.7 In scenes reminiscent of the previous decade’s acts of civil disobedience, 
nonviolent protestors blocked landfill traffic and were dragged away by state 
troopers.8 The protests did not stop the landfill, and tons of PCB-contaminated 
soil were entombed in Warren County.9 But despite that failure, Warren Coun-
ty, and similar actions, succeeded in another respect: environmental lawyers 
were moved to think anew about their project, to reflect on the racial, econom-
ic, and other forms of inequity in the distribution of environmental harms. En-
vironmental justice entered the discourse of environmental law. 
Forty years since the birth of the environmental justice movement, envi-
ronmental injustice persists: 
•   A Michigan civil rights commission investigation confirms the role of 
“systemic racism” in the Flint water disaster.10  
                                                        
2  This seminal event in the history of environmental justice is detailed in JAMES SALZMAN & 
BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 38–39 (3d ed. 2010). 
3  United States v. Ward, 676 F.2d 94, 95 (4th Cir. 1982); A Watershed Moment for Envi-
ronmental Justice—the Warren County PCB Protests, N.C. DEP’T. NAT. CULTURAL RES. 
(Feb. 26, 2013), https://www.ncdcr.gov/blog/2013/02/26/a-watershed-moment-for-environm 
ental-justice-the-warren-county-pcb-protests [https://perma.cc/J4BW-HADE]. 
4  Ward, 676 F.2d at 97. 
5  SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 39. 
6  See id. 
7  See id. 
8  55 Arrested in Protest at a Toxic Dump in Carolina, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 1982), https://w 
ww.nytimes.com/1982/09/16/us/55-arrested-in-protest-at-a-toxic-dump-in-carolina.html [htt 
ps://perma.cc/B84A-NK8C]. 
9  SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 39. 
10  MICH. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N, THE FLINT WATER CRISIS: SYSTEMIC RACISM THROUGH THE 
LENS OF FLINT 2 (2017) (“We are not suggesting that those making decisions related to this 
crisis were racists, or meant to treat Flint any differently because it is a community primarily 
made up by people of color. Rather, the disparate response is the result of systemic racism 
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•   In Africatown, Alabama, a community founded in the 1860s by kid-
napped west-Africans, continues to struggle against the effects of dec-
ades of industrial contamination.11 
•   EPA scientists find that African Americans continue to be exposed to 
significantly more particulate pollution than whites.12 
•   Researchers find that people of color make up a disproportionate share 
of those living near U.S. hazardous waste facilities.13 
Four decades after Warren County, the state of environmental justice in the 
United States remains a disappointment. Why? 
One reason is the failure to identify a viable constitutional root for envi-
ronmental justice doctrine. Early environmental justice advocates quickly dis-
covered that equal protection’s hostility to disparate impact claims was a signif-
icant doctrinal problem because environmental injustice actions are often about 
correcting institutional, systemic patterns of discrimination, rather than demon-
strably overt racism.14 Time and again over four decades, this “disparate impact 
problem” stymied environmental justice efforts.15 
Over the same time period, a resurgence in federalism has resulted in addi-
tional theoretical hurdles for pursuing environmental justice under federal law. 
In the equal protection realm, the federalism problem takes the form of City of 
Boerne v. Flores, in which the United States Supreme Court used concerns 
about federalism and Congressional overreach at the expense of local control to 
justify limiting Congress’s power to independently define the meaning of 
“equal protection.”16 Since the mid-1990s, federalism has also become more of 
a concern under the Commerce Clause, traditionally another major source of 
authority for civil rights legislation.17 This is especially the case in regulatory 
areas regarded as traditional state functions, arguably including the kind of land 
use decisions often involved in environmental justice disputes.18 These federal-
ism considerations further complicate reliance on equal protection and the 
Commerce Clause as bases for environmental justice action. 
                                                                                                                                
that was built into the foundation and growth of Flint, its industry and the suburban area sur-
rounding it. This is revealed through the story of housing, employment, tax base and region-
alization which are interconnected in creating the legacy of Flint.”). 
11  See Lauren Zanolli, ‘Still Fighting’: Africatown, Site of Last US Slave Shipment, Sues 
over Pollution, GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/2 
6/africatown-site-of-last-us-slave-ship-arrival-sues-over-factorys-pollution [https://perma.cc/ 
96C5-HEWF]. 
12  Ihab Mikati et al., Disparities in Distribution of Particulate Matter Emission Sources by 
Race and Poverty Status, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 480, 480 (2018). 
13  Robert D. Bullard et al., Toxic Wastes and Race at Twenty: Why Race Still Matters After 
All of These Years, 38 ENVTL. L. 371, 373 (2008). 
14  See cases discussed infra Part II. 
15  See cases discussed infra Part II. 
16  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
17  See discussion of Lopez and related cases infra Section III.B. 
18  See discussion of Lopez and related cases infra Section III.B. 
19 NEV. L.J. 509, KONAR-STEENBERG 4/8/2019  6:48 PM 
512 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:2  
Confronted with these difficulties and a disappointing track record, this es-
say uses Warren County’s fortieth anniversary to reexamine a question that has 
not been addressed for decades: Whether the Thirteenth Amendment might 
provide a fertile environment for a flourishing law of environmental justice?19 
This essay argues that the answer is yes, for several reasons. 
First, despite assertions to contrary, the Supreme Court has never fore-
closed pursuit of disparate impact litigation under the Thirteenth Amendment 
as it has under equal protection.20 This essay argues that the Court should not 
do so, based on the Thirteenth Amendment’s constitutionally distinct substan-
tive equality approach and its origins in the mission of antisubordination of Af-
rican Americans. 
Second, the Thirteenth Amendment holds advantages over equal protection 
and the Commerce Clause as a source of authority for environmental justice 
legislation. Compared to Equal Protection, the Court has never applied Boerne-
style federalism limits to the Thirteenth Amendment, nor should it do so. 
States’ rights arguments are particularly dubious in the Thirteenth Amendment 
context, and the amendment’s original intent (expressed by the amendment’s 
authors) confirms that there is no valid federalism-based apology for perpetuat-
ing the badges and incidents of slavery such as those arising in environmental 
justice cases. 
Compared to the Commerce Clause, the Thirteenth Amendment presents a 
cleaner basis for federal involvement in what might otherwise be regarded as 
purely local land use decisions. Current Commerce Clause doctrine requires 
Congress to identify to a court’s satisfaction a “substantial effect” on interstate 
commerce; no such showing is required under the Thirteenth Amendment.21 
Moreover, protecting “traditional state functions” from Congressional intru-
sion—or, in a phrase, states’ rights—can hardly be a legitimate basis for object-
ing to Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment power, given the necessity for and 
history of that amendment.22 
This essay is organized in four parts. Part I will describe how environmen-
tal justice’s distributive justice vision was at odds with environmental law’s 
positivist, proceduralist core, and how that difference helps to account for the 
difficulties that followed. Part II will describe one of those difficulties: the dis-
parate impact problem and the considerable drag it has imposed on equal-
protection-based efforts to pursue environmental justice. Part III will take up 
the potential federalism issues arising under the equal protection clause and 
                                                        
19  Marco Masoni’s groundbreaking piece, The Green Badge of Slavery, appears to be the 
first work to address the Thirteenth Amendment’s potential in environmental justice cases. 
Marco Masoni, The Green Badge of Slavery, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 97, 98 (1994). 
Since Masoni’s work, both Boerne and Lopez have changed the legal landscape with respect 
to federalism aspects of civil rights law, as discussed in infra Part III. 
20  See infra Section IV.A. 
21  See discussion infra Part IV. 
22  See infra note 145. 
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Commerce Clause, respectively. Part IV will explain the advantages that a 
Thirteenth Amendment approach may hold over these equal protection and 
Commerce Clause paths in relation to the disparate impact problem and the 
federalism problem. 
I. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND TRADITIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE VERSUS FORM 
Before Warren County, environmental law discussions were dominated by 
a debate between two perspectives, which Professor Salzman labels “environ-
mental rights” and “utilitarianism and cost-benefit analysis.”23 Environmental 
rights envisioned a human right to a clean environment (the anthropocentric 
model) or, more controversially, the “right” of nature itself to be free of degra-
dation (the ecocentric model).24 The role of the law in either case was to secure 
these rights (either to humans or to the environment).25 In contrast, the utilitari-
an/cost-benefit lens viewed environmental problems in law-and-economics 
terms: environmental problems were market failures and the role of the law was 
to correct those failures.26 As Professor Salzman explains, “Supporters of 
strong environmental laws emphasized environmental rights, while those more 
sympathetic to economic concerns argued for greater consideration of costs; 
virtually no one asked how environmental harms or regulatory costs were dis-
tributed.”27 
Warren County and other early environmental justice actions sought to ap-
proach environmental law from a different perspective by introducing the sub-
stantive equality discourse associated with the civil rights movement.28 Envi-
ronmental scholars began to take up a new perspective that is variously 
described as: “the civil rights aspects of environmental law”29; “environmental 
racism”30; “the demands of poor and minority communities for equitable envi-
ronmental enforcement and facility siting”31; and “the proper distribution of 
                                                        
23  See SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 29, 34. 
24  See id. at 30–31. 
25  See id. at 31. 
26  Id. at 32–33. Another lens—“sustainable development”—focuses on questions of inter-
generational fairness. For example, the 1992 Earth Summit defined sustainable development 
as development “that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of fu-
ture generations to meet their own needs.” Environmental issues are thus analyzed in terms 
of this balance between present and future human needs. Id. at 33. 
27  Id. at 38. 
28  For examples of other early environmental justice protests, see Renee Skelton & Vernice 
Miller, The Environmental Justice Movement, NRDC (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/ 
stories/environmental-justice-movement [https://perma.cc/HTS6-TVB6]. 
29  ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT: CASES AND MATERIALS 16 (4th 
ed. 2016). 
30  SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 40. 
31  KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE: READINGS ON THE 
PRACTICE AND PURPOSES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 28 (3d ed. 2007). 
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environmental amenities, the fair correction and retribution of environmental 
abuses, the fair restoration of nature, and the environmentally fair exchange of 
resources.”32 
Today, the central focus of environmental justice is distributional justice. 
Professor Michael B. Gerrard provides a straightforward definition of environ-
mental justice that captures this focus: “minority and low-income individuals, 
communities, and populations should not be disproportionately exposed to en-
vironmental hazards, and . . . they should share fully in making the decisions 
that affect their environment.”33 EPA’s current definition similarly focuses on 
providing a meaningful role in environmental decision-making and a substan-
tively equitable distribution of environmental harms: 
Environmental justice (EJ) is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of 
all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the 
development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regula-
tions and policies. 
Fair treatment means no group of people should bear a disproportionate share of 
the negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, governmen-
tal and commercial operations or policies.34 
But while environmental justice has developed conceptually, it has yet to 
gain much foothold in environmental law itself. Professor Tarlock observes that 
American environmental law is largely procedural and contains little in the way 
of “substantive, non-positivist” principles.35 In contrast, environmental justice’s 
focus on distributional justice is distinctly “substantive”—to people living near 
a landfill site, siting procedures are less important than the very substantive re-
ality of living next to a landfill. This characteristic of environmental justice 
leads directly to the first and most intractable problems confronting the devel-
opment of environmental justice law: the disparate impact problem. 
II. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE DISPARATE IMPACT PROBLEM 
Just around the time of Warren County, the United States Supreme Court 
decided in cases like Washington v. Davis36 and Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation37 that equal protection claims 
under the Fourteenth Amendment require evidence of discriminatory intent, not 
                                                        
32  Richard O. Brooks, A New Agenda for Modern Environmental Law, 6 J. ENVTL. L. & 
LITIG. 1, 27 (1991). 
33  Michael B. Gerrard, Preface to the Second Edition, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE xxxiii (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
34  Learn About Environmental Justice, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/en 
vironmentaljustice/learn-about-environmental-justice [https://perma.cc/2YNV-QXY3] (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2019) (emphasis added). 
35  Dan Tarlock, Is a Substantive, Non-Positivist United States Environmental Law Possi-
ble?, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 159, 161 (2012). 
36  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S 229, 240–42 (1976). 
37  Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977). 
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just disparate impact.38 Of course, many environmental justice claims are nec-
essarily based on evidence of disparate impact rather than overt discrimina-
tion.39 As a result, equal protection claims based on environmental injustice 
have proved very difficult to sustain. 
One of the most widely cited examples of this difficulty is R.I.S.E. v. 
Kay.40 Like the events of Warren County, R.I.S.E. involved community re-
sistance to the siting of a new landfill.41 At trial on its equal protection claims, 
the plaintiff community group proved that in a county populated evenly by 
whites and blacks, twenty-one of the twenty-six families living along the road 
leading to the new landfill were black.42 The plaintiffs further showed that the 
county had sited three other landfills in predominantly black areas.43 Based on 
this evidence the district court expressly found that “placement of landfills in 
King and Queen County from 1969 to the present has had a disproportionate 
impact on black residents.”44 Despite this finding, the district court upheld the 
county’s decision because plaintiffs had failed to prove that this particular sit-
ing choice was the product of intentional racial discrimination.45 “To the con-
trary,” the court concluded, “The Board appears to have balanced the econom-
ic, environmental, and cultural needs of the County in a responsible and 
conscientious manner.”46 The Fourth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opin-
ion.47 
Other siting cases have led to similar results, with plaintiffs prevailing only 
in exceptional circumstances where evidence of disparate impact is strong 
enough that a jury might infer discriminatory intent.48 The disparate impact 
                                                        
38  See Philip Weinberg, Equal Protection, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 3, 6–10 
(Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008). The Court’s more recent opinions 
invalidating race-conscious measures that benefit racial minorities bear some kinship to 
these cases, in the sense that such measures seek to achieve substantive, rather than formal or 
procedural, equality. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 253–54 (2003); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315–16 (2003); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 752–53 (4th ed. 2011). But see Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. 
Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 590 (1983) (“Holding that Title VI does not bar such af-
firmative action if the Constitution does not is plainly not determinative of whether Title VI 
proscribes unintentional discrimination in addition to the intentional discrimination that the 
Constitution forbids.”). 
39  See Philip Weinberg, Equal Protection, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra 
note 38, at 11. 
40  The case is discussed numerous works on environmental justice, including Masoni, supra 
note 19, at 110–13. 
41  R.I.S.E. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1147–48 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
42  Id. at 1148. 
43  Id. 
44  Id. at 1149. 
45  Id. at 1149–50. 
46  Id. at 1150. 
47  R.I.S.E. v. Kay, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992). 
48  For example, in Miller v. City of Dallas, plaintiffs’ claims survived summary judgment 
where the record showed that that zoning and landfill siting decisions in a community with a 
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problem has thus “severely limited the ability of plaintiffs to utilize the courts 
to take action against perceived environmental injustices.”49 And this problem 
extends beyond constitutional claims to affect statutory and administrative civil 
rights actions as well. 
For example, disparate impact considerations have derailed environmental 
justice efforts under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including an EPA 
administrative process that was specifically intended to target environmental 
justice claims.50 In 1983, a badly fractured Supreme Court held that proof of 
discriminatory intent is required in order to recover compensatory relief section 
601 of Title VI.51 The Court left open the possibility of pursuing disparate im-
pact claims under section 602, which authorizes federal agencies to adopt regu-
lations addressing racially discriminatory effects.52 But after a number of agen-
cies adopted such regulations, the Supreme Court in 2001 delivered another 
blow by holding that section 602 did not provide a private cause of action for 
litigants to seek direct judicial enforcement.53 As a result of these cases, the on-
ly viable path for Title VI disparate impact claims was through administrative 
adjudication.54 
Unfortunately, that administrative adjudication process as it relates to envi-
ronmental justice has foundered on the disparate impact problem. According to 
a 2016 report by the United States Commission on Civil Rights, in the nearly 
300 Title VI complaints that have come before the EPA since 1993, the agency 
has never made a formal finding of discrimination.55 The commission found 
that this reluctance traces directly to the disparate impact problem: 
                                                                                                                                
98 percent minority population were tainted by a history of racial segregation and other poli-
cies from which a jury could infer discriminatory intent. Miller v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A. 
3:98–CV–2955–D, 2002 WL 230834, at *1, *6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2002). 
49  See Michael B. Gerrard, Preface to the Second Edition, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 33, at xxxv. 
50  For more on prospects for using Title VI in environmental justice cases, see Bradford C. 
Mank, Title VI, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 23, 23–24 (Michael B. Gerrard & 
Sheila R. Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
51  See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983). 
52  Id. at 601–02 (“To ensure that this intent would be respected, Congress included an ex-
plicit provision in § 602 of Title VI that requires that any administrative enforcement action 
be ‘consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial as-
sistance in connection with which the action is taken.’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. Although an 
award of damages would not be as drastic a remedy as a cutoff of funds, the possibility of 
large monetary liability for unintended discrimination might well dissuade potential nondis-
criminating recipients from participating in federal programs, thereby hindering the objec-
tives of the funding statutes.”) (citing Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 633 
F.2d 232, 261–62 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
53  See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). 
54  Bradford C. Mank, Title VI, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 50, at 
24. 
55  U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: EXAMINING THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VI AND 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,898 40 (2016). 
19 NEV. L.J. 509, KONAR-STEENBERG 4/8/2019  6:48 PM 
Winter 2018] ROOT AND BRANCH 517 
Despite its regulatory authority to withdraw financial assistance from recipients, 
the Office of Civil Rights has long “avoided [pursuing] civil rights complaints 
alleging discrimination based on disparate impact for fear that the agency would 
lose such a case if challenged in court, even though almost all the Title VI com-
plaints over the last two decades are based on the theory.”56 
Judicial hostility to disparate impact claims has thus plagued the environ-
mental justice movement from its birth forty years ago to the present. 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE FEDERALISM PROBLEM 
In the face of the difficulties described above, some argue that Congress 
should adopt legislation specifically tailored to the needs of environmental jus-
tice claims rather than trying to repurpose existing civil rights authorities.57 
This section explores potential federalism-based objections to pursuing such 
new and specific environmental justice legislation under two traditional sources 
of federal civil rights legislation: the Fourteenth Amendment and the Com-
merce Clause. 
                                                        
56  Id. (quoting Jackson Shuffling of Key EPA Civil Rights Office State Sparks Criticism, 30 
INSIDEEPA.COM (2009)). In the absence of effective federal environmental justice legisla-
tion, environmental justice action at the federal level has been mostly limited to executive 
action. Yet even the marquee federal environmental justice measure, President Clinton’s Ex-
ecutive Order No. 12,898, has not lived up to expectations. Order 12,898 directs certain fed-
eral agencies, including EPA, to “make achieving environmental justice part of [their] mis-
sion[s] by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse 
human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority 
populations and low-income populations.” Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 
11, 1994). But an assessment of the impact of the executive order concluded that although it 
had “a major impact on how agencies integrate environmental justice issues into their activi-
ties,” the “challenge of fulfilling the order’s goals remains unfinished.” Bradford C. Mank, 
Executive Order 12,898, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 101, 142–43 (Michael B. 
Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008). During the reign of President George W. 
Bush, the director of EPA’s Office of Environmental Justice opined that the environmental 
justice concerns at the heart of the order could not serve as the basis for substantive decisions 
because “use of racial classifications as a basis for making decisions would raise significant 
legal issues” akin to those raised in cases involving race-conscious affirmative action 
measures. Id. at 117–18 (citation omitted). Finally, the fact that an executive order—rather 
than a statute—is the marquee environmental justice measure is itself telling. In fact, Con-
gress has never passed environmental justice legislation. Representative John Lewis intro-
duced an environmental justice bill in 1992; decades later, that bill has yet to pass. H.R. 
5326, 102d Cong. (1992). A smattering of state legislatures have taken tentative steps in the 
direction of environmental justice. See BARRY E. HILL, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LEGAL 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 160, 164, 166, 168, 169, 171, 173 (2d ed. 2012) (describing envi-
ronmental justice laws in Arkansas, Louisiana, Georgia, Kentucky, Alabama, Delaware, and 
California). 
57  Senator Cory Booker has authored a bill to reverse Sandoval; it is not likely to pass any-
time soon. Brentin Mock, Cory Booker’s New Bill Has a “Snowball’s Chance in Hell” of 
Passing, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 14, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.motherjones.com/environm 
ent/2017/11/corey-bookers-new-bill-has-a-snowballs-chance-in-hell-of-passing/ [https://per 
ma.cc/6C97-A9GD]. 
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A. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Federalism: City of Boerne 
A useful starting point for thinking about federalism’s relationship to equal 
protection is Dean Chemerinsky’s division of Supreme Court equal protection 
precedent into two modes or perspectives: the “nationalist perspective” and the 
“federalist perspective.”58 The nationalist perspective is illustrated by Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, which concerned Congress’s ability under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to regulate the use of state literacy tests for voting.59 Prior to Kat-
zenbach, the Supreme Court had upheld such tests against equal protection 
challenge.60 In response, Congress adopted provisions of the Voting Rights Act 
prohibiting a specific kind of literacy test aimed at people from Puerto Rico.61 
New York challenged the law, arguing that Congress lacked the authority to 
independently redefine this kind of literacy test as an equal protection viola-
tion.62 In other words, the state argued that Congress’s powers under the Four-
teenth Amendment were essentially limited to providing remedies for equal 
protection violations identified by the judiciary.63 
The Katzenbach court disagreed and held that Congress was not limited “to 
the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch 
was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional.”64 Instead, the Court explained, the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended Congress to have “the same 
broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause” that would apply 
to other Congressional powers.65 
The contrasting “federalist perspective” on this question is reflected in 
Boerne, which came three decades after Katzenbach and largely displaced it.66 
The case emerged from the aftermath of Employment Division v. Smith, which 
held that neutral laws of general applicability were not subject to heighted re-
view under the Free Exercise clause.67 Relying on its Fourteenth Amendment 
powers, Congress responded to Smith by adopting the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act (RFRA).68 The RFRA provided that neutral laws of general ap-
plicability that substantially burdened free exercise of religion were prohibited 
unless narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.69 
                                                        
58  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, at 299. 
59  See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 643 (1966); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
38, at 299–300. 
60  See Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1959). 
61  Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 652. 
62  Id. at 348–49. 
63  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, at 300. 
64  Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 648–49. 
65  Id. at 650. 
66  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 528 (1997); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 38, at 301, 303. 
67  See Emp’t Div. Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990). 
68  Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512. 
69  Id. at 515–16. 
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The case thus featured a pattern of judicial and legislative action roughly 
analogous to Katzenbach: the Supreme Court interpreted a constitutional pro-
tection narrowly (free exercise, in this case), and Congress responded by inde-
pendently redefining that right more broadly. Despite these similarities, the 
Boerne court struck down this portion of RFRA, and, in so doing, it departed 
from Katzenbach in two important ways. 
First, the Court flatly held that “Congress does not enforce a constitutional 
right by changing what the right is.”70 This conclusion stands in stark contrast 
to Katzenbach’s observation that Congress’s powers go beyond “the insignifi-
cant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch was pre-
pared to adjudge unconstitutional . . . .”71 Justice Kennedy explained the need 
for this rule by invoking Marbury v. Madison and the need for judicial suprem-
acy in constitutional interpretation, lest the Constitution fall to “a level with or-
dinary legislative acts.”72 
Second, the Court jettisoned Katzenbach’s deferential Necessary and Prop-
er Clause standard of review and replaced it with a novel form of heightened 
scrutiny.73 According to Justice Kennedy, Congressional action under the Four-
teenth Amendment requires “a congruence and proportionality between the in-
jury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”74 Justice 
Kennedy explained that this heighted scrutiny was necessary to protect the 
states from laws like RFRA, whose “[s]weeping coverage ensures its intrusion 
at every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of 
almost every description and regardless of subject matter.”75 This “test,” osten-
sibly rooted in federalism, enables courts to second-guess Congressional “intru-
sions” into the state sphere. It apparently operates as a kind of sliding scale: 
when the historical record of discrimination is strong, Congress is freer to act; 
and when evidence is weak, Congressional authority becomes more uncertain. 
Applied to the facts of Boerne, the Court concluded that Congress failed to 
meet the proportionality and congruence test because the record did not (in the 
Court’s view) reveal a long (enough) history of religious intolerance in state 
law.76 
                                                        
70  Id. at 519. 
71  Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649 (1966). 
72  Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529. 
73  Id. at 519–20. 
74  Id. at 520. 
75  Id. at 532. 
76  Id. at 534–35. Dean Chemerinsky notes several problems with the holding. For example, 
the Ninth Amendment provides that the “enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” As Dean Chemer-
insky observes, this strongly suggests that the Constitution is a floor—not a ceiling—on pro-
tectable liberties. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, at 304. Even so, the Supreme Court has ex-
pressed interest in expanding the principle to the Fifteenth Amendment. See Nw. Austin 
Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202–03 (2009); see also Rick Hasen, The 
Curious Disappearance of Boerne and the Future Jurisprudence of Voting Rights and Race, 
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Boerne thus poses a variety of potential barriers for effective federal envi-
ronmental justice legislation based on equal protection. Like similar constitu-
tional tests that measure rights against historical pedigree, Boerne privileges 
Congress’s ability to solve old problems over its power to take on new ones.77 
To the extent that environmental justice is characterized as a novel extension of 
equal protection, it bumps up against Boerne’s proscription on Congressional 
definition of new rights.78 It is also unclear whether a historical record of envi-
ronmental injustice could be assembled in a manner that would satisfy a court’s 
sense of “proportionality” and “congruence.” On one hand, unequal distribution 
of environmental harms is nothing new; on the other, the notion of land use 
planning (let alone environmental siting procedures) post-dates slavery by dec-
ades. Finally, the disparate impact problem described above might be under-
stood as a subspecies of the larger Boerne problem, for any effort to define 
equal protection as including freedom from disparate impact arguably would be 
“changing what the right is,” in the words of Boerne.79 
B. The Commerce Clause and Federalism: Lopez, Morrison, and Raich 
At least in theory, there is no constitutional problem with disparate impact 
measures under the Commerce Clause.80 But the Supreme Court’s reintroduc-
tion of Tenth Amendment-tinged federalism concerns with Congressional over-
reach and “traditional state functions” in the 1990s does give rise to potential 
arguments about the constitutionality of environmental justice measures, espe-
cially those involving matters such as zoning and siting of environmentally 
noxious land uses.81 
In 1995, the Court in United States v. Lopez sought to restore what it saw 
as an eroding “distinction between what is truly national and what is truly lo-
cal” in Commerce Clause analysis.82 From the New Deal until the 1990s, Con-
gress’s authority to legislate under the Commerce Clause had been subject to a 
                                                                                                                                
SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 25, 2013, 7:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/the-curious-
disappearance-of-boerne-and-the-future-jurisprudence-of-voting-rights-and-race/ [https://per 
ma.cc/perma.cc/3JK8-8C59]. 
77  In this sense, the Boerne test begins to resemble the problematic “traditional state func-
tions” test adopted in Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 849–52 (1976), over-
ruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), rejected in Gar-
cia, and revived in Lopez. See infra Section III.B. 
78  See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. The disparate impact problem might be understood as an 
extension of this principle: to define equal protection as including freedom from disparate 
impact would be “changing what the right is,” to use the phraseology of Boerne. 
79  Id. 
80  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
81  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
82  Id. at 567–68 (majority opinion); see also BOB ROBERTS (Paramount Pictures 1992) (not-
ing song “Times Are Changing’ Back”). Cf. Billy Bragg, The Times They Are A-Changing 
Back, YOUTUBE (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0K7gyTQuuls [https:// 
perma.cc/JQP5-4YL8]. 
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deferential, rational basis test.83 That test was summarized in Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States, in which the Court upheld the prohibition on discrimi-
nation in public accommodations in the Civil Rights Act of 1964: “The only 
questions are: (1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial 
discrimination by motels affected commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis, 
whether the means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and appro-
priate.”84 The Court dismissed states’ rights arguments with the quip, “[I]f it is 
interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the opera-
tion which applies the squeeze.”85 
The Lopez court replaced this deferential test with a more restrictive brico-
lage assembled from bits of Gilded Age and New Deal Commerce Clause doc-
trine. The case involved a challenge to a federal law making it a crime to pos-
sess a firearm in a school zone.86 The Court struck down the law and along with 
it the Commerce Clause interpretation that had prevailed since 1937.87 
The Lopez version of the Commerce Clause begins with a three-category 
sorting hat88 exercise: 
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. 
Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though 
the threat may come only from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress’ com-
merce authority includes the power to regulate . . . those activities that substan-
tially affect interstate commerce.89 
Of course, the hard cases fall into the third category, and there Congress’ 
authority is measured according to four90 (or five91) considerations. 
The first (often outcome determinative) consideration is whether the regu-
lated activity is “economic” in nature.92 If it is, then Congress may rationally 
conclude that interstate commerce is substantially impacted by aggregated in-
                                                        
83  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557. 
84  Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); see also 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, at 266–67 (“These decisions reflect the breadth of Congress’s 
commerce power, but they are not surprising under the doctrines developed since 1937.”). 
85  Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258 (quoting United States v. Women’s Sportswear 
Mfg. Ass’n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949)). 
86  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
87  Id. at 567–68. 
88  See id. at 558–59; J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE 117–18 
(1997). 
89  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59 (citations omitted). 
90  Id. at 560–64. 
91  In addition to these considerations, the Court has indicated that it will consider whether 
the challenged measure is part of a broader and comprehensive regulatory regime. Id. at 561 
(“Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which 
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated”); see 
also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 28 (2005). 
92  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–60. 
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dividual economic conduct.93 If it is not, then the legislation in question faces 
additional questions: Does the legislation contain jurisdictional language to 
limit its reach to interstate commerce?94 Is it justified by findings or other evi-
dence showing sufficiently direct causation, or is that causal chain too attenuat-
ed and indirect?95 Does the federal law regulate in an area traditionally regulat-
ed by the states?96 
This last consideration reveals most clearly the activist federalism compo-
nents of modern Commerce Clause analysis. Just a few years earlier, the Court 
had rejected as unworkable the idea that the Tenth Amendment shields “tradi-
tional” state functions from federal law.97 Then-justice Rehnquist promised in 
his dissent that the traditional-state-function concept would rise again.98 In 
Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist made good on that promise: 
Under the theories that the Government presents in support of § 922(q), it is dif-
ficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal 
law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign. 
Thus, if we were to accept the Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to 
posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.99 
These Commerce Clause revisions raise two yellow flags for environmen-
tal justice. First, the revised analysis has already proven hostile to civil rights. 
The Lopez majority’s treatment of Heart of Atlanta is telling: A landmark civil 
rights case that had been about Congress’ broad Commerce Clause authority 
over the substantial, national, negative impacts of racial discrimination was re-
cast as an unexceptional case about Congress’s power to regulate roads.100 
More acutely, the Court’s very next application of the Lopez framework was to 
strike down civil rights legislation aimed at deterring violence against wom-
en.101 In United States v. Morrison, the Court invalidated the Violence Against 
Women Act on grounds that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in 
any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”102 The Court perceived grave dan-
                                                        
93  Id. at 560. 
94  Id. at 561–62. 
95  Id. at 562–64. 
96  Id. at 564. 
97  Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546–47 (1985) (“We therefore 
now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity 
from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmen-
tal function is ‘integral’ or ‘traditional.’ Any such rule leads to inconsistent results at the 
same time that it disserves principles of democratic self-governance, and it breeds incon-
sistency precisely because it is divorced from those principles.”). 
98  Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent 
to spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again com-
mand the support of a majority of this Court.”). 
99  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. 
100  Id. at 558 (citing Heart of Atlanta as an example of Congress’s power to regulate chan-
nels of interstate commerce). 
101  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601 (2000). 
102  Id. at 613. 
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ger to state sovereignty should Congress be permitted to conclude that violence 
against women substantially affects interstate commerce: “Petitioners’ reason-
ing, moreover, will not limit Congress to regulating violence but may, as we 
suggested in Lopez, be applied equally as well to family law and other areas of 
traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and 
childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant.”103 Of course, 
this would also seem to be potentially true of racial discrimination in public ac-
commodation and, more importantly for our present purposes, Warren County-
style environmental justice claims challenging local land use determinations. 
A second warning flag is planted very close to the first, in the way 
Lopez/Morrison refetishized localism.104 One way to understand the Court’s 
transmutation of Heart of Atlanta into a case about interstate highways is that 
this conversion permits the Court to treat the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as if it 
does not regulate purely local activity on the basis of its impact on interstate 
commerce (which it plainly does). That kind of magical thinking becomes even 
more necessary when dealing with something as intensely local as a challenge 
to a city land use decision. It might well be possible to use a similar categorical 
maneuver—for example, to argue that Congress can regulate the environmental 
justice aspects of landfill siting because landfill space is an article of interstate 
commerce and therefore within the regulable category of things and people in 
interstate commerce.105 But at a minimum it seems likely that any efforts to use 
Commerce Clause authorities to regulate local land use decisions raising envi-
ronmental justice issues will have to contend with the current doctrine’s hostili-
ty to federal intrusion into areas of traditionally local regulation. 
As this discussion suggests, resurgent activist federalism in the courts cre-
ates additional uncertainties about pursuing environmental justice by means of 
equal protection or the Commerce Clause. Boerne makes it less certain that 
Congress would be permitted to legislate on environmental justice under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, especially in a way that dispenses with the intent re-
quirement, because such legislation may be characterized as novel and “chang-
ing what the right is.”106 Meanwhile, on the Commerce Clause side of things, 
Lopez and Morrison arm courts with the ability to second guess Congressional 
determinations concerning substantial impact on interstate commerce, a capa-
bility some courts may feel especially compelled to use when traditional, local 
control of land use is at stake. Together, these federalism developments further 
complicate pursuit of environmental justice through the usual constitutional 
routes. 
 
                                                        
103  Id. at 615–16. 
104  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68. 
105  Cf. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (treating landfill space as an 
article of interstate commerce under the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine). 
106  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S 507, 519 (1997). 
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IV. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
This part explains how the Thirteenth Amendment can serve as an addi-
tional, more promising source of authority for environmental justice action be-
cause it is not—and should not be—subject to the disparate impact and federal-
ism problems described above. 
A. The Thirteenth Amendment and Disparate Impact 
This section first demonstrates that current Supreme Court precedent does 
not impose an intent requirement on Thirteenth Amendment claims. It then ar-
gues that such a requirement should not be imposed in light the original intent 
of the amendment’s authors to eradicate the vestiges of slavery including its 
“badges and incidents.” Having disposed of the intent issue, this section con-
cludes with a discussion of how the Thirteenth Amendment’s historical concern 
with denied property rights as one such “badge and incident” is a promising ba-
sis for pursuing environmental justice. 
1. Supreme Court Precedent Does Not Impose an Intent Requirement for 
Thirteenth Amendment Claims. 
At least one widely noted constitutional treatise (cited frequently through-
out the rest of this essay) opines that “the Thirteenth Amendment requires proof 
of a discriminatory purpose,” based on the United States Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in City of Memphis v. Greene.107 This section argues that this conclusion 
misperceives Greene’s actual holding and reasoning, both of which left the via-
bility of disparate impact claims under the Thirteenth Amendment unresolved. 
Greene involved a challenge to the city’s decision to close a road linking a 
black neighborhood to a white neighborhood.108 City officials defended the de-
cision on grounds of public safety and reducing “traffic pollution,” but some 
black residents saw it differently and challenged the closure under the Thir-
teenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which was adopted under that 
amendment.109 Reminiscent of R.I.S.E., the district court found that the closure 
would “have disproportionate impact on certain black citizens” and that the 
traffic diverted would be “overwhelming [sic] black.”110 Nevertheless, the dis-
trict court ruled against the black residents, in part because they had not proved 
discriminatory intent or purpose.111 The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the 
                                                        
107  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, at 728 n.135 (citing City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 
100 (1981)). 
108  Greene, 451 U.S. at 102. 
109  “All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, 
as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real 
and personal property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012); Greene, 451 U.S. at 102. 
110  Greene, 451 U.S. at 110. 
111  Id. at 107–08. 
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black residents could show that the closing was a “badge of slavery” without 
having to show that similar applications by black neighborhoods had been re-
jected.112 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and ruled in favor 
of the city, finding that “a review of the justification for the official action chal-
lenged in this case demonstrates that its disparate impact on black citizens 
could not [be] fairly characterized as a badge or incident of slavery.”113 
Lifted from its context, this isolated statement could imply that “justifica-
tion for the official action” (i.e., purpose or intent) rather than disparate impact, 
is the proper constitutional focus under the Thirteenth Amendment.114 But that 
is not what the Greene Court actually held. To the contrary, the majority ex-
pressly disavowed any intention of “confront[ing] prematurely the rather gen-
eral question whether either [section] 1982 or the Thirteenth Amendment re-
quires proof of a specific unlawful purpose . . . .”115 The Court stated plainly: 
To decide the narrow constitutional question presented by this record we need 
not speculate about the sort of impact on a racial group that might be prohibited 
by the Amendment itself. We merely hold that the impact of the closing of West 
Drive on nonresidents of Hein Park is a routine burden of citizenship; it does not 
reflect a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.116 
The outcome in Greene thus did not turn on the question of discriminatory 
intent. Instead, as the quote above suggests, it turned on the absence of evi-
dence of constitutionally cognizable injury in what the Court took to be a fairly 
routine road closure. Throughout the opinion, Justice Stevens dismisses the 
plaintiffs’ asserted injuries as de minimis, observing for example that the “clos-
ing has not affected the value of property owned by black citizens, but it has 
caused some slight inconvenience to black motorists.”117 The Court says that 
such inconvenience does not compare with the “odious practice the Thirteenth 
Amendment was designed to eradicate”118 and goes on to reject “the symbolic 
significance of the fact that most of the drivers who will be inconvenienced by 
the action are black.”119 
In fact, Justice Stevens’s focus on insufficiently serious injury, rather than 
inadequate evidence of intent, led Justice White to write a testy concurring 
                                                        
112  Greene v. City of Memphis, 610 F.2d 395, 400–02 (6th Cir. 1979). 
113  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, at 728–29 n.135. 
114  Id. 
115  Greene, 451 U.S. at 120. 
116  Id. at 128–29 (emphasis added). 
117  Id. at 119 (emphasis added). 
118  Id. at 128. 
119  Id. In this respect, the matter begins to look more like a case about Article III standing. 
Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755–56 (1984) (holding “abstract stigmatic injury” asso-
ciated with government’s failure to enforce discrimination laws, without more, is not a cog-
nizable injury), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Compo-
nents, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014). 
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opinion in which he takes the majority to task for ducking the intent ques-
tion.120 Justice White observed: 
Without explicitly saying so, the Court of Appeals necessarily held that a viola-
tion of § 1982 could be established without proof of discriminatory intent. The 
petition for a writ of certiorari sought review of that precise point. We granted 
review to answer the question presented in the petition for a writ of certiorari. 
The parties in their briefs proceeded on the same assumption. However, instead 
of answering the question which was explicitly presented by the findings and 
holdings below, raised by the petitioners, granted review by this Court and 
briefed by the parties, the Court inexplicably assumes the role of factfinder, pe-
ruses the cold record, rehashes the evidence, and sua sponte purports to resolve 
questions that the parties have neither briefed nor argued.121 
Justice White’s criticism of the majority opinion thus reinforces the con-
clusion that Greene simply did not decide the question of intent. 
As final confirmation of this point, the Court itself subsequently reiterated 
that Greene did not create an intent requirement under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.122 In General Building Contractors Association v. Pennsylvania, the 
Court held that although the Civil Rights Act of 1866 requires proof of discrim-
inatory intent as a matter of statutory interpretation, it was not necessary to de-
termine the same question with respect to the interpretation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.123 The Court stated that it “need not decide whether the Thirteenth 
Amendment itself reaches practices with a disproportionate effect as well as 
those motivated by discriminatory purpose, or indeed whether it accomplished 
anything more than the abolition of slavery,” and cited Greene.124 
In short, a close review of precedent shows that the Court has not found an 
intent requirement under the Thirteenth Amendment. The next section explains 
why the Court should decline future invitations to do so. 
2. The Thirteenth Amendment Should Not Include an Intent Requirement. 
Having established above that the Supreme Court has not required proof of 
discriminatory intent in Thirteenth Amendment claims, this section argues that 
it should not do so. An intent requirement is inappropriate to Thirteenth 
Amendment analysis because the Thirteenth Amendment differs in fundamen-
tal ways from equal protection analysis. Critically, the Thirteenth Amendment 
has a substantive and not merely formal goal—the goal of undoing the subordi-
                                                        
120  The city of Memphis’s brief described the question presented as “Whether a violation of 
42 U.S.C. § 1982 and the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution can be 
established without a showing of racially discriminatory intent or purpose.” Brief for Peti-
tioners at 4, City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (No. 79-1176), 1980 WL 
339373, at *4. 
121  Greene, 451 U.S. at 129–30 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
122  See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 378, 390–92 n.17 
(1982). 
123  Id. at 390–92 n.17. 
124  Id. 
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nation of African Americans in America. That anti-subordination goal includes 
dismantling of the badges and incidents of slavery, among them the disabilities 
imposed on African American property rights. 
Statements by the amendment’s supporters lend support to the idea that the 
amendment was intended to go beyond slavery and address racial subordina-
tion. The day after the amendment’s ratification, Senator Lyman Trumbull, 
senate author of the amendment, spoke on the Senate floor to urge Congress to 
adopt implementing legislation, “lest by local legislation or a prevailing public 
sentiment in some of the States persons of the African race should continue to 
be oppressed and in fact deprived of their freedom.”125 Shortly thereafter, 
Trumbull introduced what would become the Civil Rights Act of 1866, stating, 
“This measure is intended to give effect to that declaration and secure to all 
persons within the United States practical freedom. There is very little im-
portance in the general declaration of abstract truths and principles unless they 
can be carried into effect[.]”126 In subsequent debates on the act, Trumbull stat-
ed, “I have no doubt that, under [section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment] we 
may destroy all these discriminations in civil rights against the black man; and 
if we cannot, our constitutional amendment amounts to nothing.”127 
Senator Wilson of Massachusetts similarly stated that the Thirteenth 
Amendment “obliterat[ed] the last lingering vestiges of the slave system; its 
chattelizing, degrading and bloody codes; its dark, malignant barbarizing spirit; 
all it was and is, everything connected with it or pertaining to it.”128 And Sena-
tor Charles Sumner stated that the amendment abolished slavery “root and 
branch . . . in the general and the particular . . .  in length and breadth and then 
in every detail . . . . Any other interpretation belittles the great amendment and 
allows slavery still to linger among us in some of its insufferable preten-
sions.”129 
These anti-subordination themes are also a long-standing feature of Thir-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence, starting (unlikely as it may seem) with the 
Civil Rights Cases of 1883.130 There, the Supreme Court held that none of the 
Civil War amendments authorized the expansive antidiscrimination provisions 
                                                        
125  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 431 (1968). 
126  Id. (emphasis added). 
127  Id. at 440. Notably, the Act included a clause providing that “all persons born in the 
United States and not subject to any foreign power . . . are hereby declared to by citizens of 
the United States,” thereby overturning the conclusion that Dred Scott was not a citizen. Civ-
il Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
(2012)); see also Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 90 B.U. L. REV. 255, 282 (2010). 
128  William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badg-
es and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1339 (2007). 
129  Id. at 1343. 
130  See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, at 
294–97. 
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.131 But along the way, the Court recognized that 
the Thirteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to reach state and private con-
duct not only to eradicate slavery, but to eradicate “all badges and incidents of 
slavery.”132 
Although the phrase “badges and incidents of slavery” does not appear in 
the Thirteenth Amendment itself,133 Professor Mason McAward’s research 
links it to continued legal and social subordination of former slaves. Around the 
time of the amendment’s ratification, “incidents” was apparently understood to 
refer to the legal restrictions accompanying slavery itself, such as laws prohibit-
ing slaves from owning property.134 The term “badges” had a less settled mean-
ing.135 Sometimes it was just a synonym for “incidents” (legal disabilities) so 
that a freed slave was no longer marked by the “badges” of slavery.136 Some-
times it referred to the inescapability of skin color.137 But crucially, sometimes 
it was used to refer to government or private acts that would “mark [freed 
slaves] as a subordinate brand of citizens.”138 
Subordination is also a vital theme in the Court’s landmark Thirteenth 
Amendment decision Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company. In Jones, the Court 
applied rational-basis review to uphold the constitutionality of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1982, and its application to racial dis-
crimination in private home sales.139 The Court cited with approval Senator 
Trumbull’s declaration that the purpose of the law was to ensure that “all the 
badges of servitude . . . be abolished.”140 The Court observed that the congres-
sional debates on the law were “replete with references to private injustices 
against Negroes” and that to the “Congress that passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, it was clear that [property rights] might be infringed not only by ‘State or 
local law’ but also by ‘custom or prejudice.’ ”141 
The Jones Court also noted that it had previously upheld the statute’s ap-
plication to racially restrictive covenants that “covered only two-thirds of the 
lots of a single city block” in Washington, D.C.142 The Court observed that 
“[a]lthough the covenants could have been enforced without denying the gen-
eral right of Negroes to purchase or lease real estate, the enforcement of those 
                                                        
131  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25. 
132  Id. at 20. 
133  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
134  Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 561, 570–78 (2012). 
135  Id. at 570, 575–78. 
136  Id. at 578. 
137  Id. at 576. 
138  Id. at 578. 
139  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440–41, 443 (1968). 
140  Id. at 424–26 n.31. 
141  Id. at 423, 427 (citation omitted). 
142  Id. at 418 (discussing Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948)). 
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covenants would nonetheless have denied the Negro purchasers ‘the same right 
as is enjoyed by white citizens [to buy property].’ ”143 The Court concluded: 
Just as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War . . . were substitutes for the 
slave system, so the exclusion of Negroes from white communities became a 
substitute for the Black Codes. And when racial discrimination herds men into 
ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin, 
then it too is a relic of slavery.144 
Justice Douglas’s concurrence echoes the anti-subordination themes of the 
majority: 
The true curse of slavery is [that it] produced the notion that the white man was 
of superior character, intelligence, and morality. The blacks were little more 
than livestock—to be fed and fattened for the economic benefits they could be-
stow through their labors, and to be subjected to authority, often with cruelty, to 
make clear who was master and who slave. Some badges of slavery remain to-
day. While the institution has been outlawed, it has remained in the minds and 
hearts of many white men.145 
As this record shows, the Thirteenth Amendment was intended by its au-
thors to serve an anti-subordination purpose. This purpose, in turn, justifies 
concluding that intent has no useful role to play in Thirteenth Amendment 
analysis.146 As Professor Zietlow explains, there are significant differences be-
tween the “formal equality” that has come to characterize equal protection and 
the “anti-subordination” roots of the Thirteenth Amendment.147 Most im-
portantly, anti-subordination is “not neutral” but necessarily involves recogni-
tion of disparate impact and race-conscious decision-making in ways not toler-
                                                        
143  Id. (quoting Hurd, 334 U.S. at 34). 
144  Id. at 441–43. 
145  Id. at 445 (Douglas, J., concurring). The Jones court held that § 1982 (and the Thirteenth 
Amendment) reach private conduct. This absence of a state action requirement speaks to the 
federalism issue as well, in that the lack of a state action requirement is that it is, in a way, an 
assertion of the absoluteness of the Thirteenth Amendment’s reach. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s state action requirement immunizes private discrimination and state discrimination 
that fails to meet the formal requirements of the Court’s state-action tests; the Commerce 
Clause’s traditional state function element might insulate local land use decisions from Con-
gressional action. But the Thirteenth Amendment contains no such safe harbors. Everyone—
private citizens, states, local governments, public/private hybrids—is subject to the same in-
junction. Congress therefore should have maximum latitude to identify and eradicate the 
badges and incidents of slavery, including acts that have a disproportionate environmental 
impact. 
146  See McAward, supra note 134, at 617 (“[T]here is no reason to think that the concept of 
the badges and incidents of slavery contains an intent requirement.”); see also Jones, 392 
U.S. at 439–40 (“[T]he majority leaders in Congress—who were, after all, the authors of the 
Thirteenth Amendment—had no doubt that its Enabling Clause contemplated the sort of pos-
itive legislation that was embodied in the 1866 Civil Rights Act.”) (emphasis added). 
147  Zietlow, supra note 127, at 266–67 (“[T]he Thirteenth Amendment is facially based on 
an anti-subordination model because [it provides] . . . a positive guarantee against both race 
discrimination and the exploitation of workers . . . . This ban on slavery and involuntary ser-
vitude clearly is not neutral because it gives workers rights against their masters. It aims to 
destroy a hierarchical system and to empower those that suffered under that system.”). 
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ated by equal protection analysis.148 While a system of formal equality arguably 
requires an intent element to distinguish between “equal” and “unequal” treat-
ment, a system of substantive equality with a substantive goal of ending the 
subordination of a specific group has no need of an intent requirement.149 In-
stead, the actions can be judged on the substantive basis of whether they per-
petuate subordination. For these reasons, the absence of an intent requirement 
makes the Thirteenth Amendment a potentially more effective path to pursuing 
environmental justice claims founded on disparate impact and historical subor-
dination. 
3. Anti-Subordination, Property Rights, and Environmental Justice 
The discussion above explains why intent should not be a factor in Thir-
teenth Amendment claims. This section completes the argument by explaining 
how environmental injustice can be viewed as a badge and incident of slavery 
while at the same time avoiding complaints of doctrinal overreach. 
A predictable objection to treating environmental injustice as a badge and 
incident of slavery is that it is an overreach, pushing the phrase beyond any-
thing its authors could have had in mind. In response, it is worth noting that 
modern environmental regulation is not as novel as it might seem; environmen-
tal law has common law precursors150 and as early as 1899 Congress had made 
it a misdemeanor to pollute or alter navigable waters without a permit.151 Even 
so, there is sense to Professor Carter’s observation that “[i]f the Thirteenth 
Amendment is to realistically mean anything . . . it cannot mean everything.”152 
Accordingly, he has proposed that determining whether a particular practice 
amounts to a badge or incident of slavery should rest on two considerations de-
signed to limit and bound the concept: “(1) the connection between the class to 
which the plaintiff belongs and the institution of chattel slavery, and (2) the 
connection the complained-of injury has to that institution.”153 
Applying Professor Carter’s limiting test, it is clear that many environmen-
tal justice claims will meet the first prong. Many of today’s examples of envi-
ronmental injustice are traceable to the historical subordination of African 
Americans. Thus, today, we see that African Americans are exposed to signifi-
cantly more particulate pollution.154 Racially discriminatory redlining in Flint, 
                                                        
148  See id. at 266. 
149 See Masoni, supra note 19, at 108 (“Therefore, in the context of environmental discrimi-
nation, the search for intent, or intent by way of impact, is potentially misleading and irrele-
vant.”). 
150  See ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 
62–65 (3d ed. 2000). 
151  Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425 § 10, 30 Stat. 1151 (1899) (codi-
fied as amended 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2012)). 
152  Carter, supra note 128, at 1378. 
153  Id. at 1366. 
154  Mikati et al., supra note 12, at 480. 
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Michigan in the 1930s ensured that 2014’s water disaster hit a city that is dis-
proportionately African American.155 The district court in R.I.S.E. acknowl-
edged the disparate impact of the county’s landfill siting on African Ameri-
cans.156 
Second, environmental justice claims are tied to the institution of slavery 
by virtue of the denial of property rights to African Americans in slavery and 
for decades thereafter.157 The ties between slavery and property ownership are 
made clear from the fact that Congress’s first act under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment was to guarantee to all citizens “the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white 
citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property.”158 Cases like Jones and Hurd confirm this connection between slav-
ery and property rights.159 As Justice Douglas put it, “Enabling a Negro to buy 
and sell real and personal property is a removal of one of many badges of slav-
ery.”160 Property ownership brings with it dignity and respect. As James Ash-
ley, author of the Thirteenth Amendment in the House of Representatives, ob-
served: “Wherever the negro is free and is educated and owns property, you 
will find him respected and treated with consideration . . . .”161 Given the cen-
trality of property rights to the meaning of “badges and incidents,” it is no 
stretch at all to conclude that disproportionate siting of landfills in areas dispro-
portionately African American has the potential to reverse such social gains, 
not only by devaluing real property but also by signaling that society deval-
ues—that is, subordinates—the residents themselves.162 
                                                        
155  Dustin Dwyer, See the Maps from the 1930s that Explain Racial Segregation in Michi-
gan Today, ST. OPPORTUNITY (June 27, 2014), http://stateofopportunity.michiganradio.org/p 
ost/see-maps-1930s-explain-racial-segregation-michigan-today [https://perma.cc/4B7M-8RE 
F]. An obvious question that follows is whether environmental justice protections under the 
Thirteenth Amendment are just for African American people, or whether other groups are 
similarly protected. That question is beyond the scope of this essay, but Carter sketches ways 
in which his test would be satisfied upon a showing that the group in question has been sub-
jected to conduct with “an intimate connection to the societal structures both supporting and 
created by slavery.” Carter, supra note 128, at 1372. 
156  R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
157  See Masoni, supra note 19, at 105 (“A specific aspect of race-based environmental dis-
crimination that may be susceptible to being labeled as a badge and incident of slavery is 
land use discrimination.”). 
158  42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012). 
159  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 418–20 (1968). 
160  Id. at 444 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
161  Chas. S. Ashley, Governor Ashley’s Biography and Messages, in 6 CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF MONTANA 148, 153 (1907). 
162  On this point, it is worth noting that had the Greene litigants presented better evidence of 
property impacts, the outcome might well have been different. See City of Memphis v. 
Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 117–18 (1981) (discussing weakness of property value evidence). 
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B.  The Thirteenth Amendment and Federalism 
Perhaps the best argument for rejecting federalism-based limits on the 
Thirteenth Amendment is original intent: as the historical record shows, states’ 
rights arguments were considered and rejected during the amendment’s ratifica-
tion. 
Opponents of the amendment argued that “it would give Congress virtually 
unlimited power to enact laws for the protection of Negroes in every State,” yet 
the amendment was adopted anyway—signaling that its adopters intended to 
subordinate federalism itself to racial anti-subordination.163 Anticipating 
Boerne decades before it was decided, Senator Trumbull, senate author of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, stated during legislative debate on the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866: “Who is to decide what that appropriate legislation is to be? The Con-
gress of the United States; and it is for Congress to adopt such appropriate leg-
islation as it may think proper, so that it be a means to accomplish the end.”164 
Trumbull’s statement is more than forceful rhetoric; it is an argument about 
constitutional law based on Justice Marshall’s declaration in McCulloch v. 
Maryland: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitu-
tion, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that 
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the consti-
tution, are constitutional.”165 Similarly, Representative Wilson of Iowa, speak-
ing on behalf of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, drew upon that declaration when 
he said: 
The end is legitimate . . . because it is defined by the Constitution itself. The end 
is the maintenance of freedom . . . . A man who enjoys the civil rights mentioned 
in this bill cannot be reduced to slavery. . . . This settles the appropriateness of 
this measure, and that settles its constitutionality.166 
In this sense, the very existence of the Thirteenth Amendment and its sub-
stantive objectives predetermined the answers to Boerne’s “proportionality and 
congruence” questions. Unlike Boerne, where the record of state-sanctioned 
religious intolerance was too thin for the Court’s liking, there can be no ques-
tion about whether there exists an adequate historical record of slavery and its 
badges and incidents.167 Therefore, Congressional power under the Thirteenth 
Amendment is at its maximum—that is, coextensive with its power under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. This understanding is validated by the Jones 
court’s observation that “[s]urely Senator Trumbull was right. Surely Congress 
has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what 
                                                        
163  Jones, 392 U.S. at 439. 
164  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 321–22 (1865). 
165  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
166  Jones, 392 U.S. at 443–44. 
167  See discussion supra Section III.A. 
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are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that 
determination into effective legislation.”168 
This reasoning is further reinforced by a series of recent lower court rul-
ings169 examining constitutionality of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, 
Jr., Hate Crimes Act of 2009, which was adopted under section two of the Thir-
teenth Amendment.170 In each of these cases, the court refused to extend 
Boerne to the Thirteenth Amendment and rejected arguments under other fed-
eralism precedents like Lopez and Morrison aimed at limiting the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s reach.171 
In United States v. Beebe, the court set forth several reasons why federal-
ism did invalidate the act.172 First, the court found “nothing in the language of 
City of Boerne that indicates that it silently intended to do something as sweep-
ing as displacing the centuries-old standard of McCulloch v. Maryland and 
overruling . . . Jones.”173 The court instead determined that “Jones set forth the 
proper standard under which courts should analyze the constitutionality of leg-
islation enacted pursuant to Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment: review 
for rationality.”174 
Second, the court rejected the defendants’ federalism arguments under the 
Tenth Amendment as refracted by Lopez and Morrison.175 The defendant ar-
gued that regulation of hate crimes was an improper intrusion into “the prov-
ince of the states.”176 But the court determined that “when Congress passed 
Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment and expressly delegated to Con-
gress power to enforce the ban on slavery, the states could no longer claim any 
reserved exclusive power over this area.”177 The court distinguished Lopez and 
Morrison as cases in which the links between the regulated conduct (gun pos-
session and violence against women, respectively) and interstate commerce 
                                                        
168  Jones, 392 U.S. at 440. 
169  See United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Beebe, 807 
F. Supp. 2d. 1045, 1049 (D.N.M. 2011), aff’d sub nom.; see also United States v. Cannon, 
750 F.3d 492, 505 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Metcalf, No. 15–CR–1032-LRR, 2016 
WL 827763, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 2, 2016); United States v. Henery, 60 F.3d. 1126, 1128 
(D. Idaho 2014). 
170  18 U.S.C. § 249(a) (2012). The act includes among its findings that “eliminating racially 
motivated violence is an important means of eliminating, to the extent possible, the badges, 
incidents, and relics of slavery and involuntary servitude.” Matthew Shepard and James 
Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 4702, 123 Stat. 2190, 2835–36 
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171  Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d. at 1057. 
172  Id. at 1058. 
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174  Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d. at 1048. 
175  Id. at 1057. 
176  Id. 
177  Id. (emphasis added). 
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“were very attenuated.”178 “In contrast, [the Shepard/Byrd Act’s] link to the 
Thirteenth Amendment is far tighter, because . . . it targets directly a badge of 
slavery. Therefore, the Tenth Amendment does not come into play.”179 
Finally, the court observed that “it is unclear that the Tenth Amendment’s 
federalist concerns limit the Thirteenth Amendment to the same extent that they 
limit the Commerce Clause, because unlike the Commerce Clause, the Thir-
teenth Amendment was passed after the Tenth Amendment and enacted a direct 
command on the states and individuals alike.”180 
CONCLUSION 
This essay demonstrates that the Thirteenth Amendment holds significant 
advantages over Equal Protection and Commerce Clause authorities when it 
comes to pursuing environmental justice. The Thirteenth Amendment’s anti-
subordination purpose means that discriminatory intent is not required for a vi-
able environmental justice claim. And the amendment’s authors made clear that 
they brooked no federalism-based objections to Congress’s reach under the 
amendment, making it more suited to legislative solutions aimed at environ-
mental justice. 
Forty years after Warren County, the time has come to find a new path to-
wards environmental justice. As this essay demonstrates, one path that deserves 
greater exploration lies through the Thirteenth Amendment. 
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179  Id. 
180  Id. at 1057 n.7 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455–56 (1976)) (“[H]olding 
that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike the Commerce Clause, limited Elev-
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